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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
outside the state was held sufficient notice to satisfy the due process clause
of the Constitution. The court said: "Enjoyment of the privileges of resi-
dence within the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection of
its laws, are inseparable. from the various incidences of state
citizenship.
Why cannot it be said that the enjoyment of the privilege to make con-
tracts and do other acts within the state with the right to invoke the pro-
tection of the state laws be, as in relation to domicile, the reciprocal right
of the State to cause submission to its jurisdiction for actions arising out of
these specific acts enumerated in the statute? All the Constitution requires
as to service is that it gives "reasonable assurance that the notice will be
actual."'67 The sending of notice by ordinary mail by the Secretary of
State after substituted service upon him has been held sufficient.68 What
would be better notice than service of the summons personally on the de-
fendant?
The struggle by the states to acquire jurisdiction over nonresidents is
finally nearing its goal. It seems only fair that a nonresident should be per-
sonally liable in the state where he has created the injury. The state where
the action arose could try the case better because of its courts having ju-
dicial notice of their own laws, and also because the witnesses and evi-
dence in the case would most certainly be in the local state. Section 17 of
the Illinois Practice Act is most welcomed as in line with the gradual de-
velopment of jurisdictional concepts.
66 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
67 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
68 Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Products, 122 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C., 1954).
ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
Evidence used in convicting the defendant of violating the California
gambling laws had been obtained by the concealment of listening devices
on defendant's premises and by numerous forcible entries and seizures
without warrants. In reversing his convictions, the California Supreme
Court, in People v. Cahan,1 declared that the evidence used in convicting
the defendant was seized in violation of both the California and U.S. con-
stitutional provisions regarding search and seizure, and that such illegally
obtained evidence should not have been entertained. The court expressly
overruled its previous decisions (of some thirty-five years) about admis-
sion of evidence secured through an unlawful search and seizure,2 laying
emphasis on the fact that its new rule is not founded upon constitutional
1282 P. 2d 905 (Cal., 1955).
2 People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922); People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal.
535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909); and "the cases based thereon."
COMMENTS
or statutory provisions, but is merely a judicially created rule of evidence,
which, as experience dictates, can be changed or nullified in the future by
its own decisions, or by an act of the legislature.
By this holding, the California Supreme Court has, in a forthright and
clear-cut manner, turned its back upon a long history3 of steadfast en-
forcement of the common law rule that illegal search and seizure does
not impart to evidence any characteristic that will effect its admissibility. 4
The court points up and in a sense fosters the distinction raised in Wolf v.
Colorado5 that the enforcement of the prohibition against unlawful search
and seizure is an issue entirely separate from the prohibition itself, and
that it does not necessarily follow from the prohibition that evidence se-
cured in its violation must be excluded. It reiterates the proposition in the
Wolf case that the due process clause of the 14th Amendment demands
that the people be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and that
such freedom be protected by more than an empty sanction. The court,
reviewing other methods of enforcing this right of privacy, decided that
a tort remedy for damages was unsatisfactory because no more than actual
damages could be collected, 6 and since, as a rule, these would be small,
there is little inhibiting effect, if any, upon the law enforcement officers.
The other method of insuring the right of privacy, namely a criminal pen-
alty, was rejected after a consideration of the number of prosecutions un-
der the existing statutes.7 Thus, by a process of elimination, the court
settled upon the pros and cons of the exclusionary rule, deciding in the
end that the only way to effectuate the prohibition against unlawful
search and seizure was to refuse to entertain such illegally obtained evi-
dence.
The court was careful to say that it is not bound by the decisions that
have applied the federal rule and seems to foresee the necessity of formu-
lating its own workable rule in such a manner as to avoid the needless re-
finements and distinctions to which other jurisdictions might have fallen
prey. Thus, the court has adopted the general principle of the federal
courts, that evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure
is inadmissible, emphasizing that for the moment, the principle is all that is
3 People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P. 2d 8 (1953); People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.
2d 169, 137 P. 2d 1 (1943); People v. Gongales, 133 Cal. App. 429, 24 P. 2d 553 (1933);
People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 535 (1922); People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 353,
102 Pac. 517 (1909).
4 McCormick, Evidence § 137 (1954).
5 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
6 Wallis, Measure of Damages When Property Is Wrongfully Taken by a Private
Individual, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 419 (1909).
762 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. (1954) § 242. See Appendix to opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 153 (1954).
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being adopted and that it has a clear field ahead in modifying and applying
the rule.
The federal exclusion rule made its first appearance in the case of Boyd
v. U.S." where the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a portion of
a customs statute which required the production of private papers under
penalty of having allegations of opposing attorney taken as confessed. The
court declared that to require such production would be equivalent to re-
quiring a man to be a witness against himself, and in addition would be
tantamount to a forcible search and seizure. By this decision, not only did
the statute go down but also did the common law rule of admissibility.
The rule was followed until 1904 when in Adams v. N.Y.9 the Supreme
Court was asked to apply the new Federal rule to a state proceeding.
There the defendant had appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court from a
conviction under the New York gambling laws, assigning the admission of
illegally seized evidence as error. The court said that if there had been an
illegal search and seizure, the admission of such evidence would not have
violated the United States Constitution in any case, and for that reason the
court did not discuss whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments applied
to the states. While some of the text writers point to that case as a repu-
diation of the Boyd doctrine, other cases up until the time of Weeks v.
U.S.10 speak of the Boyd case with respect.1 The Weeks case, decided in
1913, was the first time the issue of admissibility was decided predomi-
nantly on the Fourth Amendment. Previous decisions cited the Boyd doc-
trine as being mainly a question of self-incrimination, as where legal pres-
sure is put on a person to produce private papers, the legal pressure being
equivalent to a search and seizure, and the production of the private
papers being the self-incrimination. The Weeks case involved the search
of a private residence without a warrant. In deciding that such evidence
was inadmissible, the court saw fit to distinguish its problem from that in
the Adams case by the fact that in this case, application had been made in
due season for the return of the seized articles, and that the court's refusal
had been in violation of the accused's rights. Thus, the use of the articles
in the criminal trial amounted to prejudicial error. The approach was
much the same as in the Boyd case, namely, "A man's home is his castle";
however, the emphasis was put more on the search and seizure as a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.
Having been spearheaded by the federal courts, the adoption of the rule
spread to the states in what Professor Wigmore called "misguided senti-
8116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9192 U.S. 585 (1904).
10232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11 Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906); Bullmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906).
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mentality."' 2 Since the basis of the exclusion rule is not the reliability
of the evidence, or the fact that it might be misleading, but rather
the invasion of a person's constitutional right of privacy, the right of re-
dress or objection attaches only to the person whose rights have been in-
vaded. Also, since the Fourth Amendment's prohibition is directed at
federal action, there have developed over the years, decisions which might
be termed exceptions to the general rule:
1) The illegal search and seizure must be made by a Federal officer, or one
in collusion with him to come within the rule. l3
2) The illegal search and seizure must constitute an injury against the per-
son invoking the rule,14 either against his person or his property without his
consent.15
Since the Weeks case softly reiterated the rule that a court will not stop
in the midst of a trial to try collateral issues and since it was on this point
that the court distinguished itself from the Adams case, the rule developed
in the federal courts that a timely pre-trial motion must be made before
the court will consider the illegality through which the evidence was se-
cured. In recent years, the federal courts have relaxed this rule to allow
the subject to be first considered at the trial if the facts regarding the un-
lawful seizure are not disputed, 1 or if the defendant did not know of the
grounds for the motion.'7 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have
abrogated the rule even further by making it discretionary with the court
whether or not the motion will be heard at the trial.'8 Some states follow
the older federal rule and require a motion before the trial, 19 and others
allow the issue to be determined by motion during the trial.20
The question of whether or not the federal rule of exclusion as a guar-
antee of the right of privacy is applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was presented to the United
States Supreme Court in the Wolf case and reaffirmed recently in Irvine
v. California.21 There, the issue was put squarely before the court, and
while the court recognized the principle of the Fourth Amendment as
applying to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, it declared that
128 Wigmore, Evidence S 2184 (3d ed., 1940).
S8 Rettich v. U.S., 84 F. 2d 118 (C.A. 1st, 1936); Bookbinder v. U.S., 287 Fed. 790
(C.A. 3d, 1923).
14 Safarik v. U.S., 62 F. 2d 892 (C.A. 8th, 1933).
15 Ah Fook Chang v. U.S., 91 F. 2d 805 (C.A. 9th, 1937).
16 Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
17 Gouled v. U.S., 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
18 Fed Rules Crim. Proc. 41 (c); U.S. v. Asendio, 171 F. 2d 122 (C.A. 3d, 1948).
19People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557 (1919).
20 Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920).
21347 U.S. 128 (1954).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
the exclusion rule was merely a means of enforcing that principle, and was
not essential to it. However, the wording in both cases was such as to leave
the door open for the court later to declare that the due process clause
demands such exclusion.
Illinois adopted the exclusion rule over thirty years ago in the case of
People v. Brocamp.22 There the court reaffirmed the proposition that a
court will not stop to try collateral issues, but added that where timely
motion for the return of illegally seized evidence has been made before
the trial, it is error to admit such evidence. Later it was declared that the
court can postpone determination of the motion to some time during the
trial, so long as the motion was made before trial,23 failure to make the
motion at the proper time constituting a waiver of the objection. 24 How-
ever, if the motion is overruled the defendant must still object to the ad-
mission of the evidence at the trial in order to keep the issue alive so that
it can be brought up again on appeal. 25 For the same reasons as in the fed-
eral courts, the Illinois exclusionary rule requires that the search and sei-
zure be done by state officials or those in collusion with them, and that the
person objecting be the person whose rights were invaded. Thus, it can be
seen that the application of the rule in Illinois is very similar to that in the
federal courts.
People v. Berger,21 a companion case handed down on the same day and
by the same court as the Cahan case, presented the additional questions of
whether photostats of illegally seized evidence which had been returned
on order of a previous mandamus proceeding could be introduced as evi-
dence and whether the issue of search and seizure could be brought up at
the trial without having been preceded by a pre-trial motion. The court
held, citing Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. U.S.,2 7 that the photostats were just
as tainted by the unlawful search and seizure as the original evidence and
for that reason are inadmissible. As to the timeliness of the objection, the
court found no problem in holding that as a matter of practicality the
question could be brought up at the trial without a preliminary motion.
Thus, in two swift steps California has adopted the federal rule, giving it
the same stature as other rules of admissibility.
The court in the Cahan case followed the lead in the Irvine case and
without hesitation applied the exclusion rule to evidence obtained by dic-
tographs which were placed on the defendant's premises by trespassing of-
22 307 I11. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
23 People v. Kissane, 347 Il. 385, 179 N.E. 850 (1932).
2 4 People v. Dalpe, 371 111. 607, 21 N.E. 2d 756 (1939).
25 People v. Reid, 336 111. 421, 168 N.E. 344 (1929); People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 160
N.E. 86 (1928).
26 282 P. 2d 509 (Cal., 1955). 27 251 U.S. 385 (1920),
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ficers. The problem immediately brought to mind is whether the technical
physical trespass to the home made in the process of secreting the devices
or whether the eavesdropping by means of the device constituted a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. More fundamentally, the question is
whether the Fourth Amendment is truly a guarantee of a right to privacy
in every sense of the word or is it merely a guarantee of a right to be free
from trespass by meddling officials? The Boyd case understood the scope
of the Fourth Amendment to include a constructive search and seizure by
force of a statute, while later in Goldman v. U.S.28 where a detectograph
(amplifier) had been used to eavesdrop on private conversations, the court
seemed to turn its decision on whether or not there had been a technical
trespass. Certainly, the use of an amplifier to overhear conversations on
the other side of a wall is just as much an invasion of privacy as the use of
a dictaphone secreted by breaking and entering, yet the former is not
within the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment, while the latter, be-
cause of the trespass is. The same principles are illustrated in the famous
case of Olmstead v. U.S.29 where wire tapping was held not to violate the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, the law today seems to hinge on the fact of
whether or not a technical trespass has been committed in the process of
delving into a person's privacy. One wonders if the California Supreme
Court in the Cahan case has made a sweeping condemnation of the prin-
ciple of unreasonably invading a person's privacy whether it is by means
of a dictograph, detectograph or battering ram, or whether it has merely
condemned the trespass committed incidentally in such invasion. As the
methods of scientific investigation progress, the question will have to be
answered.
28 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
29 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
DISCHARGED SERVICEMEN NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
AMENABLE TO COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
The amenability of an ex-serviceman to trial by court-martial for
crimes allegedly committed while in the military service came before
the United States Supreme Court this term in Toth v. Quarles.' The
Court determined that a military tribunal had no jurisdiction over the dis-
charged veteran and declared unconstitutional Article 3 (a) of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice 2 which purported to give the military
176 S. Ct. 1 (1955).
264 Stat. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. S 553 (a) (1951) which provides: "Subject to the
provisions of section 618 of this title, any person charged with having committed,
while in a status in which he was subject to this chapter, an offense against this chap-
